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AS DETECTION AND NEGATION
CLAIM OF PRIORITY
[0001] This patent application claims the benefit of priority of Song et al., U.S.

Provisional Patent Application Serial Number 62/833,153, titled “HAS DETECTION
AND NEGATION,” filed on April 2, 2019 (Attorney Docket No. 4568.006PRV),

which is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE
[0002] This document pertains generally, but not by way of limitation, to unm anned

aerial systems (UASs), such as including an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a

corresponding ground control station, and

ore particularly, to detection of UAVs,

and optionally, negation of such vehicles.

BACKGROUND
[

3] The advent of new technologies has led to the emergence of relatively

inexpensive, highly-maneuverable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Such UAVs
have raised concerns regarding privacy, public safety, and security. One threat posed
by unauthorized operation of a UAV is inadequate control over UAVs that penetrate
sensitive areas. In one approach, an acoustic (e.g., sound-based) technique can be
used to identify a presence of a UAV. However, such an approach can present
challenges. For example, an acoustic technique may only provide limited detection

range and may not be able to provide spatial localization of a detected UAV location,
particularly in three dimensions. In another approach, UAVs could be required to
transmit their position using a standardized protocol or beacon, such as using
Automated Dependent Surveillance

Broadcast (ADS-B). However, such an

approach can also present challenges. Many existing UAVs are not equipped (and

may not be economically equipped) to provide beaconing, particularly “ADS-B Out”
transmission capability, or such a transmitter could be intentionally disabled by the
user to more easily penetrate sensitive areas without detection.

I

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE
[0004] Radio-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS) provide a way to perform

certain difficult tasks without the need of putting a human pilot at risk. UAVs have
long been used to perform military tasks and surveillance tasks; however, in recent
years the availability of low-cost components has reduced the unit cost of producing
UAVs. Accordingly, UAVs are now more accessible to other industries and even to
individual hobbyists. However, the arbitrary use of UAVs by hobbyists and amateurs
has raised concerns in terms of privacy and public security. For example,

unauthorized UAVs with cameras can easily become intruders when flying over
sensitive areas such as nuclear plants or high-value targets, or when flying into certain
areas of airports.
[0005] The present inventors have recognized, among other things, that hobbyist and

amateur UAVs, in particular, are typically small a d difficult to detect by traditional
radars, and that other approaches can help alleviate threats from any type of U V In
some approaches, a wbreless distributed acoustic sensor network can identify the
appearance and estimate the position of trespassing UAVs that have entered or are
about to enter a sensitive area. Once such a UAV is detected, to cope with the
diversity i RF characteristics and telemetry protocols of amateur UAVs, the subject
matter described herein can include a software defined radio (SDR) platform to
capture and use machine learning approaches to identify and decode the telemetry
protocols of the suspected trespassing UAV. Finally, when the UAV is confirmed to
be unauthorized, control commands can be utilized to route that UAV away from

sensitive areas.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0006] In the drawings, which are not necessarily drawn to scale, like numerals may

describe similar components in different views. Like numerals having different letter
suffixes may represent different instances of similar components. The drawings
illustrate generally, by way of example, but not by way of limitation, various
embodiments discussed in the present document.
[0007] FIG.

illustrates a surveillance system for detecting and responding to

amateur UAVs.

[0008] FIG 2 illustrates signaling between various components of a system in which

example embodiments can be implemented.
[0009] FIG. 3 illustrates a general workflow of a UAV detection and negation

technique.
[0010] FIG. 4 illustrates a scheme for generating training data.
[0011] FIG. 5A illustrates a workflow of radio channel identification and reaction.
[0012] FIG. 5B illustrates modulation identification and data recovery.
[0013] FIG SC illustrates workflow of protocol identification.
[0014] FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of an example comprising a machine upon

which any one or more of the techniques (e.g., methodologies) discussed herein may
be performed.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0015] As mentioned above, the use of UAVs by hobbyists and amateurs has raised

concerns in terms of privacy and public security. For example, unauthorized UAVs
with cameras can easily be considered intruders when flying over sensitive areas such
as nuclear plants or other high-value targets (e.g., government or military

installations, sports arenas). According to the United States Federal Aviation
Administration (FA A), more than 500 such unauthorized

A

operations were

spotted between July and September 2016. UAVs can be used as weapons if they are
made to carry explosive payloads or are otherwise under the control of terrorists.
Despite such concerns, unauthorized amateur UAV operations remain difficult to
detect or control, due in part to the fact that small-size UAVs are difficult to detect by
traditional radars (e.g., aviation surveillance radar) and generally lack a radio beacon
Generally, UAVs are not entirely autonomous and a ground control station (e.g., a
handheld remote control or other device) is used to control the

AV. Even if a

location of UAV is determined, challenges may still exist in determining a location of
a corresponding remote control on the ground.
[0016] The present inventors have recognized, among other things, that at least some

of the challenges mentioned above can be addressed through apparatus and techniques
as shown and described herein. Such apparatus and techniques can include one or

more of detection and negation or ‘eviction” of an unauthorized UAV from a
sensitive area. First, systems described herein can include a wireless distributed

acoustic sensor networ to identify the appearance and estimate the position of
unwelcome UAVs. Furthermore, a software-defined radio (SDR) can use machine
learning approaches to identify ad decode the telemetry protocols of the unauthorized
UAV. Negation can be achieved such as by injecting a negation command, such as
control commands, into a control channel once the telemetry protocol has been
recognized. Negation can also include transmission of a warning or other notification
by injecting a video signal or image data according to the detected protocol, to appear

on a display of the remote control. Such transmission can also be accomplished using
an SDR-based transmitter.

[0017] If the techniques fail to properly classify the protocol, jamming can be used to
block communication between the ground control station and the UAV. A transmit
power used for one or more of commandeering control, injecting warning
information, or blocking of communication can include modulation of transmit power.
Such modulation can include establishing a transmit power sufficient to achieve the
desired control, warning injection, or signal blocking, without precluding operation of
UAVs nearby or otherwise causing unwanted interreference. Generally, the
approaches described herein can proactively secure a protected physical area from
unauthorized UAV operation while still otherwise permitting normal UAV operation
elsewhere. Approaches described herein can use information from different sources
to include detection accuracy, and distributed sensing can increase range of coverage

and sensitivity.
[0018] FIG. 1 illustrates a surveillance system 100 for detecting and responding to
amateur UAVs. A sensitive area 102 can be defined within a radius of governmental
or industrial buildings 04 or other facilities or sites that can include sensitive
information or resources. A reaction district 106 can be defined outside the sensitive
area 102, and a detection area 108 can be defined outside the reaction district 106.
The distributed wireless acoustic sensors 110 (within the detection area 108 but
outside the reaction area 106) can delect pervasive acoustic signals to determine
presence of an object 112. The object 112 (e.g., unwelcome UAV) can attempt to
cruise into detection area 108, and potentially into reaction area 106 or sensitive area
102, without legible RF beacons or other signals for identity verification. If more

than one sensor 10 detects the object 112, then a location for the object 112 can be
estimated. Additionally, beacon receivers 1 14 (within the detection area 108 but

outside the reaction area 106) can detect identity verification signals (e.g., ADS-B)
from a radio channel. Beacon receivers 1 4 can include, for example, base stations
operating in accordance with cellular standards, or any other system capable of
transmitting and receiving RF signals. Results of location information, acoustic
information, and identity verification signals can be provided (e.g., transmitted by the
beacon receiver

4) to a control center

6. The control center

6 (or, e.g.,

processing circuitry 602 (FIG. 6) or other computer system within the control center
116) can trigger various actions described below if the control center 1 16 determines

that the object 112 is a trespassing UAV, according to criteria described later herein,
or if the control center

6 cannot identify the object 1 2 based on information

provided by sensors 110 or beacon receiver 114.
[0019] SDR receivers 118 scan radio channels typically used by amateur UAVs (e.g.,
object 1 12 or similar UAVs) of a detection area

8 or areas within a threshold

distance of the detection area 108. By using pattern recognition techniques described
later herein, processing circuitry (e.g., processing circuitry 602 (FIG. 6) included in,
for example, SDR receivers 118, surveillance UAVs 120, control center 116, or
authentication server 122), the telemetry control and video streaming channel of the
object 1 12 can be identified.
[0020] FIG. 2 illustrates signaling between various components of a system in which
example embodiments can be implemented. .Some amateur UAVs (e.g., object 112),
maintain at least two data links with a ground station 200: a bidirectional telemetry
link 202 to receive commands and a unidirectional analog video stream channel 204.
By using pattern recognition techniques described later herein, processing circuitry
(e.g., processing circuitry 602 (FIG. 6) included in, for example, SDR receivers
surveillance UAVs 120, control center

18,

6, authentication server 122, or protocol

analysis server 206), the telemetry control and video streaming channel of the object
2 can be identified. Upon such identification, apparatuses a d systems according to

embodiments can transmit warning information into the analog video stream channel
204 to attempt to direct the operator of the object 112 to evacuate the surveillance
area. In other embodiments, telemetry link 202 can be jammed or blocked, which can

cause the object

12 to return to ground station 200.

[0021] FIG. 3 illustrates a general workflow of a UAV detection and negation
technique 300. Operations of technique 300 can be performed by processing circuitry

(e.g., processing circuitry 602 (F G. 6 included in, for example, SDR receivers 118,

surveillance UAVs 120, control center 16, authentication server 122, or protocol
analysis server 206). Technique 300 can begin with operation 302 by processing
circuitry scanning a wireless channel for potential wireless communication signals
(e.g., suspicious signals) corresponding to object

2 operation. Such scanning can

include monitoring known ranges of frequencies corresponding to UAV telemetry or
video transmission signals. As described with reference to FIG. 2 above, amateur
UAVs generally maintain two radio links with the ground control station 200: a
bidirectional telemetry link 202 to handle control commands and status information;
and a unidirectional video stream (e.g , an analog video signal). If any signal is

classified as being transmitted by a flying UAV or a UAV remote control (as
processing circuitry determines in operation 304) d e positions of one or more RF
transmitters can be estimated in three dimensions (3D) in operation 306. Otherwise,
scanning resumes in operation 302.
0022 In operations 308 and 310, the processing circuitry estimates a signal power
of at least one of a) a telemetry signal that is transmitted by object

2 airborne RF

transmitter or b) a remaining signal strength available for use by the object 1 12
remote control. Depending on the signal power, the processing circuitry can use
information regarding the signal power to help determine transmission power for
negation transmissions, such as jamming, spoofing, warning, etc. In operation 3 2,
the processing circuitry may decode a sample of the object 112 communication
signals and use machine·· learning -based classifiers to identify one or more of a video
or a telemetry' channel. Further details regarding operation 312 are provided below
with reference to FIG. 4 and FIGs. 5 A, 5B and 5C. If decoded geographic
coordinates extracted from object 1 2 telemetry data is within a specified range of an
expected object 1 12 location, tire processing circuitry classifies the decoding as
successful in operation 3 14. If a synchronization signal corresponding to a video
frame is extracted, for example, the processing circuitry can consider the video
streaming protocol to be identified successfully.
[0023] In operation 316, if the processing circuitry has detected a video streaming
protocol, the processing circuitry may transmit, or encode for transmitting, one or
more warning video frames using an identified protocol with sufficient power to
overcome the normal video signal (e.g., a multiple of the object 1 2 video channel

transmit power such as twice the normal video channel transmit power). In operation
3 8, if the processing circuitry identifies a telemetry protocol including control
capability, the processing circuitry can transmit, or causes to be transmitted, simulated
control commands (commands 212 (FIG. 2)) to commandeer the control of the object
112, such as to direct the object

2 out of a sensitive area. Transmission can be

performed using sufficient power to overcome the normal control signal from the
remote control (e.g., a multiple of the remote control transmit power such as twice the
normal remote control transmit power). In this context, transmitting “simulated”
control commands can refer to emulating the remote control in a manner to
commandeer the control of the object 112.
[0024] In operation 320, if the processing circuitry has not identified video or
telemetry protocols can be identified or otherwise classified to allow the video or
telemetry to be commandeered, then jamming can be performed, such as to trigger a
UAV program that causes the

V to return or search autonomously to re-establish a

link with the remote control. As in example 4a and 4b, such jamming can be
performed using a transmitted power sufficient to block reception of control
commands via the normal telemetry channel, but without necessarily disrupting
operation of other UAVs farther away. Other actions can be triggered if video
warnings are not heeded and control cannot be established. For examples, the
detection techniques shown an described herein can be used to trigger dispatch of an
interceptor, such as a surveillance UAV 120 (FIG. 1), to inspect or disable the
intruding object 112.
[0025] Acoustic identification techniques, for example techniques executed by
distributed wireless acoustic sensors 1 0 can be based on the inventors’ observation
that the spectrum of UAV acoustic signals differs from the sound of natural
backgrounds. Specifically, a UAV acoustic spectrum has a stronger and more
concentrated power spectrum and steeper cutoff frequency than that of natural
background sounds. The observation also provides an indication that a ow pass filter
(LPF) with a cutoff frequency of, for example, 15 kHz, can eliminate unnecessary
noise while preserving most acoustic information.
[0026] In some embodiments, instead of defining rules for acoustic identification, a
support vector machine (SVM) is used. For each digitalized acoustic signal, fast
Fourier transform (FFT) is used to convert time domain signals into a spectral series

(including amplitude information only). To avoid manually defining rules for
acoustic identification, the support vector machine (SVM) is employed. For each
piece of digitalized acoustic signal S = {a Q,

...

a n ] with length n, and class label

the fast Fourier transform (FFT) is used to convert time domain signals into the
spectral series (amplitude only) Fi = {wo, w ,

w . Training sets are then

generated and the wireless acoustic sensors 110 in the surveillance area (e.g , within
the detection area 108 (FIG. 1) or within a threshold range outside 108 (FIG. I))
perceive acoustic signals and use pretrained dimensional reduction matrices and
classifiers to finish the pattern recognition of acoustic signals.
[0027] The wireless acoustic sensors

0 can use acoustic locating, based on the

known speed of sound, to detect object 112 location (e.g., 3D location) such as may
be performed in operation 306 (FIG. 3). The minimum distance between two

neighboring microphones of a sensor 110 should be less than the shortest wavelength
of the object 1 2 acoustic signal. In some examples, a sensor

0 can include more

than two microphones, for example seven or more synchronized microphones. Data
from multiple of the microphones of the sensor 1 10 is integrated with a time
difference of arrival (TDGA) algorithm to detect the source of the acoustic signal (i.e.,
the position of the object 112 generating the acoustic signal). The sensors 110 can
provide position information and other information to control center 116 or other
central processing system. A synchronizing system (not shown in FIG. ) may
connect the sensors 1 10 and control center 116.
[0028] As mentioned above with respect to operation 312 (FIG. 3), a received sample
of wireless communication can be automatically classified as either a telemetry or
video signal relating to UAV operation, using a machine -learning-based classifier.
Various training approaches can be used to enhance the performance of the classifier.
For example, information used to train the classifier can be enriched by using a
combination of a protocol generator along with captured ‘"real-world” signals
representative of UAV operation (including unregistered/private protocols). Protocol
generators can generate data packets conforming to one or more UAV communication
protocols (e.g.. Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink), UAVtalk” or MultiWii as
illustrative examples) .
[0029] A training approach can include generation of an enriched training dataset
using a scheme 400 as shown generally in FIG. 4. The scheme 400 can be

implemented by processing circuitry (e.g., processing circuitry 602 (FIG. 6) of control
center 1 16 (FIG. I)). The training data set generated according to scheme 400 can be
used in a machine-learning-based classifier, the classifier established to perform
classification of data corresponding to intercepted wireless signals suspected of
relating to UAV operation.
[0030] Inputs can include user-specified geography coordinates 402, UAV-related

data 404 (including, for example, make, model, size, manufacturer, etc.) The protocol
generators 406, 40B and 410 can respectively randomly output different types of data
packets (e.g., a flying status report, one or more control commands) having payloads
established in at least a semi-randomized manner. In such a semi-randomized
scheme, a range of different random values can be constrained such as to provide data
within the bounds that would be reasonable in actual operation (for example,

geographic coordinates or battery status values can be constrained to avoid
nonsensical values). Noise in the channel can be simulated at 412 by randomly
toggling bit values in the generated packets according to specified error criteria such
as bit error rates, minimum or maximum run length of error sequences, or the like.

[003 1 Packets 414, 416, 4 8 generated using known target protocols can be

combined by packets 420 corresponding to random data, and respective packets can
be labeled to provide an enriched corpus 422 of training data. Machine learning
techniques 424 such as implemented as a random forest, a support vector machine
(SVM, e.g., a one-against-all SVM) or a convolutional neural network (CNN) can

then be established using the training data.
[0032] As mentioned above with respect to operations 316, 318 and 320 (FIG. 3),

after a protocol is identified corresponding to a telemetry or video channel of an
unauthorized UAV (e.g., object 112 (F G. ) in operation, various responses can be
triggered. Such responses can include one or more of: (1) collaborative awareness,
where warning information is transmitted to enable a UAV operator to proactive
control their UAV to guide the UAV out of a sensitive area; or (2) transmission of
control commands using adaptively-determined transmit power, where simulated
commands are transmitted with sufficient power to achieve reliable control of the
UAV bypassing the UAV operator remote control, but where the simulated
commands are transmitted at a power level constrained to avoid interference with
other communications (e.g., out-of-band or in-band corresponding to other UAVs

farther away).
[0033] FIG. 5A illustrates a workflow of radio channel identification and reaction.
As shown in FIG. 5A, a system 500, implemented in processing circuitry of, for

example, control center 1 6 (FIG.
SDR receivers

)

receives RF signals from SDR receivers (e.g.,

18 (FIG. )) at block 502. Demodulated raw data 504 from the SDR

receiver can be processed by the processing circuitry (either at the control center 16
or remotely) to implement telemetry protocol identification 506 based on protocol
classifiers 514. Warning information 508 (e.g., video warning frames) can be
generated a d transmitted in response to RF recognition and decoding 5

. Simulated

commands 512 can be generated and transmitted, in response to the protocol
identification 506, wherein protocol identification 506 occurs based on protocol
classifiers 514.

Warning information 508 a d simulated commands 512 can be

transmitted by transmission processor 516 and RF transmitters 518 on the video
streaming channel (e.g., channel 208 (FIG. 2)).
[0034] FIG. 5 illustrates further details on modulation identification and data

recovery as can be performed by processing circuitry or other components of a control
center 1 16 (FIG. 1) to determine whether radio characteristics and protocols of
received transmissions. As illustrated in FIG. 5B, processing circuitry can perform a
spectral waterfall graph analysis 520 on discrete intermediate frequency (IF)
quadrature data, such as using digital image analysis techniques to derive estimates of
bandwidth 522 and operational frequencies 524 (e.g., center frequencies) along with
estimates of active timeslots 526 corresponding to suspected

AV operation.

Identified active timeslots can trigger demodulation 528 of F quadrature signals into
complex-valued baseband signals 530. A modulation pattern identification technique
532 (e.g., density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) or

other technique) can be used to identify the modulation technique (e.g., constellation
534) to get baseband symbols 536 a d convert them into data packets. IQ

demodulation 538 can be performed to identify the symbols in the modulated data
sequence to provide raw demodulated data packets 540. Regarding the video signal,
amateur

AVs generally use phase alternate line (PAL) or national television

standards committee (NTSC) video signals and frequency modulation (FM).
Accordingly, when a wireless signal is intercepted having FM modulation in the 2.4
GHz or 5.8 GHz ranges, injection 508 of warnings in the video channel can be

promptly triggered.
[0035] FIG. 5C illustrates workflow 550 of protocol identification. Operations of

workflow 550 can be performed by processing circuitry of, for example, the control
server 116 (FIG. 1 . For the illustrative example of FIG. 5C, for each protocol, a data
packet generator 552, 554 can be used to provide training samples. In the generated
packets, specific data fields can be filled with range-bound random values. For
example, values of coordinates in data packets can be limited to corresponding
geographical restrictions defining a surveillance zone. Generated data packets along
with random packets 556 can be mixed to form a training set 558 as mentioned

elsewhere herein. The training data packets can be converted into labeled vectors
with, for example, 200 dimensions. To do this, for m packets with n bytes per packet,
Pi~

B , 2, ..., Bn},

a G [Pa t, Paz, ... Pamj , an appearance probability of different

bytes, P(Bi Training set), can be determined, such as to provide a table having 256

entries. The table can be sorted in ascending order of Ρ (Β, i Training set), and a
ranking number can be regarded as its representative code. If a packet length, n, is less
than 200, zeros can be inserted to pad the packet. The vectorized packets ca be
labeled, for example, {Pai, li i

G fUAVTalk, MultiWii, Random}, and used to derive

SVM classifiers 560, to specify whether a packet is from a UAV.
[0036] A principal components analysis (PCA) technique can be used to compress a

dimensionality of the data. Knowing the UAV’s telemetry protocol, processing
circuitry (e.g., of control center

6 (FIG. ) can use protocol decoders 562 to extract

UAV payload. If GPS coordinates 564 in the data packet 566 are consistent with the
geographical range of the surveillance district, the decoding can be deemed successful
568. The most computationally intensive portions of this illustrative example of a

UAV detection scheme can be considered to be implementation of DBSCAN
(modulation identification), support vector machine (SVM) (classification), and PCA
(dimensionality reduction). For data having a length, n, a time complexity can be
represented as 0(nlog(n)), 0(n

~ n 3·4), and 0(n 3) respectively.

[0037] FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of an example comprising a machine 600

upon which any one or more of the techniques (e.g., methodologies) discussed herein
may be performed. In various examples, the machine 600 may operate as a standalone
device or may be connected (e.g., networked) to other machines. In a networked
deployment, the machine 600 may operate in the capacity of a server machine, a client

machine, or both in server-client network environments. In an example, the machine
600 may act as a peer machine in peer-to-peer (P2P) (or other distributed) network
environment. The machine 600 may be a personal computer (PC), a tablet device, a
set-top box (STB ), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile telephone, a web
appliance, a network router, switch or bridge, an embedded system such as located in
an underwater or surface vehicle, or any machine capable of executing instructions

(sequential or otherwise) that specify actions to be taken by that machine. Further,
while only a single machine is illustrated, the term “machine” shall also be taken to
include any collection of machines that individually or jointly execute a set (or
multiple sets) of instructions to perform any one or more of the methodologies
discussed herein, such as cloud computing, software as a service (SaaS), other
computer cluster configurations.
[0038] Examples, as described herein, may include, or may operate by, logic or a

number of components, or mechanisms. Circuitry is a collection of circuits
implemented in tangible entities that include hardware (e.g , simple circuits, gates,
logic, etc.). Circuitry membership may be flexible over time and underlying hardware
variability. Circuitries include members that may, alone or in combination, perform
specified operations when operating. In an example, hardware of the circuitry may be
immutably designed to carry out a specific operation (e.g., hardwired) n an example,
the hardware comprising the circuitry may include variably connected physical
components (e.g., execution units, transistors, simple circuits, etc.) including a
computer readable medium physically modified (e.g., magnetically, electrically, such
as via a change in physical state or transformation of another physical characteristic,

etc.) to encode instructions of the specific operation. In connecting the physical
components, the underlying electrical properties of a hardware constituent may be
changed, for example, from an insulating characteristic to a conductive characteristic
or vice versa. The instructions enable embedded hardware (e.g., the execution units or
a loading mechanism) to create members of the circuitry in hardware via the variable
connections to carry' out portions of the specific operation when in operation.
Accordingly, the computer readable medium is communicatively coupled to the other
components of the circuitry when the device is operating in an example, any of the
physical components may be used in more than one member of more than one
circuitry. For example, under operation, execution units may be used in a first circuit

of a first circuitry at one point in time and reused by a second circuit in the first
circuitry, or by a third circuit in a second circuitry at a different time.
[0039] Machine e.g , computer system) 600 may include a hardware processor 602
(e.g., a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a hardware

processor core, or any combination thereof), a main memory' 604 and a static memory
606, some or all of which may communicate with each other via an interlink (e.g.,
bus) 608. The machine 600 may further include a display unit Error! Reference

source

ot found. 10 , an alphanumeric input device 612 (e.g., a keyboard), and a user

interface (UI) navigation device 614 (e.g., a mouse). In an example, the display unit
610. input device 612 and UI navigation device 614 may be a touch screen display.

The machine 600 may additionally include a storage device (e.g., drive unit) 616, a
signal generation device 618 (e.g., a speaker), a network interface device 620, and one

or more sensors 621, such as a global positioning system (GPS) sensor, compass,
accelerometer, or other sensor. The machine 600 may include an output controller
628, such as a serial (e.g., universal serial bus (USB), parallel, or other wired or

wireless (e.g., infrared (IR), near field communication (NFC), etc.) connection to
communicate or control one or more peripheral devices (e.g., a printer, card reader,
etc.).
[0040] The storage device 6 6 may include a machine readable medium 622 on

which is stored one or more sets of data structures or instructions 624 (e.g., software)
embodying or utilized by any one or more of the techniques or functions described
herein. The instructions 624 may also reside, completely or at least partially, within
the mai memory 604, within static memory 606, or within the hardware processor
602 during execution thereof by the machine 600. In an example, one or any

combination of the hardware processor 602, the main memory 604, the static memory
606, or the storage device 616 may constitute machine readable media.

[0041] While the machine readable medium 622 is illustrated as a single medium, the
term "machine readable medium" may include a single medium or multiple media
(e.g., a centralized or distributed database, and/or associated caches and servers)

configured to store the one or more instructions 624.
[0042] The term “machine readable medium” may include any medium that is

capable of storing, encoding, or carrying instructions for execution by the machine
600 and that cause the machine 600 to perform any one or more of the techniques of

the present disclosure, or that is capable of storing, encoding or carrying data
structures used by or associated with such instructions. Non-limiting machine
readable medium examples may include solid-state memories, and optical and
magnetic media. Accordingly, machine-readable media are not transitory propagating
signals. Specific examples of massed machine readable media may include: non
volatile memory, such as semiconductor memory devices (e.g., Electrically
Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable
Read-Only Memory (EEPROM)) and flash memory devices; magnetic or other phasechange or state-change memory circuits; magnetic disks, such as internal hard disks
and removable disks; magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks.
[0043] The instructions 624 may further be transmitted or received over a
communications network 626 using a transmission medium via the network interface
device 620 utilizing any one of a number of transfer protocols (e.g., frame relay,
internet protocol (IP), transmission control protocol (TCP), user datagram protocol
(UDP), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), etc.). Example communication networks
may include a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a packet data
network (e.g., the Internet), mobile telephone networks (e.g., cellular networks). Plain
Old Telephone (POTS) networks, and wireless data networks (e.g., Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 family of standards known as W i
Fi®, IEEE 802.16 family of standards known as WiMax®), IEEE 802 . 5.4 family of
standards, peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, among others. In an example, the network
interface device 620 may include one or more physical jacks (e.g., Ethernet, coaxial,
or phone jacks) or one or more antennas to connect to the communications network
626. In an example, the network interface device 620 may include a plurality of
antennas to wirelessly communicate using at least one of single-input multiple-output
(SIMO), multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), or multiple-input single-output

(MISO) techniques. The term “transmission medium” shall be taken to include any
intangible medium that is capable of storing, encoding or carrying instructions for
execution by the machine 600, and includes digital or analog communications signals
or other intangible medium to facilitate communication of such software.

Various Notes
[0044] Each of the non-limiting aspects above can stand on its own, or can be

combined in various permutations or combinations with one or more of the other
aspects or other subject matter described in this document.
[0045] The above detailed description includes references to the accompanying
drawings, which form a part of the detailed description. The drawings show, by way
of illustration, specific embodiments in which the invention can be practiced. These
embodiments are also referred to generally as “examples.” Such examples can
include elements in addition to those shown or described. However, the present
inventors also contemplate examples in which only those elements sho wn or
described are provided. Moreover, the present inventors also contemplate examples
using any combination or permutation of those elements shown or described (or one
or more aspects thereof), either with respect to a particular example (or one or more
aspects thereof), or with respect to other examples (or one or more aspects thereof)
shown or described herein.
[0046] In the event of inconsistent usages between this document and any documents
so incorporated by reference, the usage in this document controls.

[0047] n this document, the terms “a” or “an” re used, as is common in patent
documents, to include one or more than one, independent of any other instances or
usages of “at least one” or “one or more.”

n this document, the term “or” is used to

refer to a nonexclusive or, such that “A or B” includes “A but not B,” “B but not A,”
and “A and B,” unless otherwise indicated. In this document, the terms “including”
and “in which” are used as the plain-English equivalents of the respective terms
“comprising” and “wherein.” Also, in the following claims, the terms “including”
a d “comprising” are open-ended, that is, a system, device, article, composition,
formulation, or process that includes elements in addition to those listed after such a
term in a clai

are still deemed to fall within the scope of that claim. Moreover, in

the following claims, the terms “first,” “second,” and “third,” etc. are used merely as
labels, a d are not intended to impose numerical requirements on their objects.
[0048] Method examples described herein can be machine or computer-implemented
at least in part. Some examples can include a computer-readable medium or machinereadable medium encoded with instructions operable to configure an electronic device
to perform methods as described in the above examples. An implementation of such
methods can include code, such as microcode, assembly language code, a higher-level
language code, or the like. Such code can include computer readable instructions for

performing various methods. The code may form portions of computer program
products. Further, in an example, the code can be tangibly stored on one or more
volatile, non-transitory, or non-volatile tangible computer-readable media, such as
during execution or at other times. Examples of these tangible computer-readable
media can include, but are not limited to, hard disks, removable magnetic disks,
removable optical disks (e.g., compact disks and digital video disks), magnetic
cassettes, memory cards or sticks, random access memories (RAMs), read only
memories (ROMs), and the like.
[0049] The above description is intended to be illustrative, and not restrictive. For
example, the above-described examples (or one or more aspects thereof) may be used
in combination with each other. Other embodiments can be used, suc as by one of
ordinary skill in the art upon reviewing the above description. The Abstract is
provided to allow the reader to quickly ascertain the nature of the technical disclosure.
It is submitted with the understanding that it will not be used to interpret or limit the
scope or meaning of the claims. Also, in the above Detailed Description, various

features may be grouped together to streamline the disclosure. This should not be
interpreted as intending that an unclaimed disclosed feature is essential to any claim.
Rather, inventive subject matter may lie in less than all features of a particular
disclosed embodiment. Thus, the following claims are hereby incorporated into the
Detailed Description as examples or embodiments, with each claim standing on its
own as a separate embodiment, and it is contemplated that such embodiments can be
combined with each other in various combinations or permutations. The scope of the
invention should be determined with reference to the appended claims, along with the
full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled.

THE CLAIMED INVENTION IS:
.

A vehicle detection and negation system, comprising:
a communication interface to receive a radio frequency (RF) signal; and
processing circuitry configured to
decode the RF signal;
identify, using a telemetry protocol classifier, a protocol under which
the RF signal was transmitted; and
responsive to determining that the protocol corresponds to an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) protocol, determine that the RF signal
corresponds to a UAV, and encode a negation command for transmission.

2.

The vehicle detection and negation system of clai

1, wherein the processing

circuitry is further configured to train the telemetry protocol classifier using a dataset
comprised of packets generated by a plurality of protocol packet generators.

3.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 2, wherein the plurality of

protocol packet generators generate packets corresponding to at least one of a Micro
Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol, a UAVtalk protocol, and a Mu Wi protocol.

4.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 2, wherein the dataset

further includes packets representative of noise of a software -defined radio (SDR).

5.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 1, further including an

interface, coupled to synchronization circuitry, to receive position information of the
UAV.

6.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 5, wherein the processing

circuitry is further configured to refrain from encoding the negation command for
transmission if the position information indicates that the UAV is not within a range
of a sensitive area.
7.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 1, wherein the processing

circuitry is further configured to estimate a signal power of the RF signal.

8.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 7, wherein the negation

command includes a video warning command transmitted to a ground control station
of the UAV.

9.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 8, wherein transmission

power of the video warning command is determined based on the signal power of the
RF signal.

10.

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 7, wherein the negation

command includes a jamming signal transmitted to the UAV at a transmission power
determined based on the signal power of the RF signal.

1 .

The vehicle detection and negation system of claim 7, wherein the negation

command includes a simulated control signal.

12.

A method for vehicle detection and negation, the method comprising:
decoding a radio frequency (RF) signal;
identifying, using a telemetry protocol classifier, a protocol under which the

RF signal was transmitted; and
responsive to determining that the protocol corresponds to an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) protocol,
determining that the RF signal corresponds to a UAV; and
encoding a negation command for transmission.

13.

The method of claim 12, further comprising training the telemetry protocol

classifier using a dataset comprised of packets generated by a plurality of protocol
packet generators, and wherein the plurality of protocol packet generators generate
packets corresponding to at least one of a Micro Air Vehicle Link (MA
protocol, a UAVtalk protocol, and a MuitiWii protocol.

14.

The method of claim 12, further comprising:
determining position infor

t on of the UAV; and

.ink)

refraining from encoding the negation command if the position information
indicates that the UA

15.

'

is not within a range of a sensitive area.

The method of claim 12, further comprising:
estimating a signal power of the RF signal.

16.

The method of claim 15, further comprising: determining transmission signal

power for transmission of the negation command based on the signal power of the RF
signal.

17.

A machine-readable medium including instructions that, when executed on

processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to perform operations including:
decoding a radio frequency (RF) signal;
identifying, using a telemetry protocol classifier, a protocol under which the
RF signal was transmitted; and
responsive to determining that the protocol corresponds to an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) protocol,
determining that the RF signal corresponds to a UAV; and
encoding a negation command for transmission.

18.

The machine-readable medium of claim 17, wherein the operations further

include:

training the telemetry protocol classifier using a dataset comprised of packets
generated by a plurality of protocol packet generators, and wherein the plurality of
protocol packet generators generate packets corresponding to at least one of a Micro
Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) protocol, a UAVtalk protocol, and a MultiWii protocol.

19.

The machine-readable medium of claim 17, wherein the operations further

include:

determining position information of the UAV; and
refraining from encoding the negation command if the position information
indicates that the UAV is no within a range of a sensitive area.

20.

The machine-readable medium of claim 17, wherein the operations further

include:

estimating a signal power of the RF signal; and
determining transmission signal power for transmission of the negation
command based on the signal power of the RF signal.

